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FOCUS SECTION—LAW IN CATHOLIC SCHOOLS
Civil Law and Catholic Education: Past, Present, 
and Future
Mary Angela Shaughnessy, SCN
St. Catharine College Kentucky
Eight years ago this author wrote an article entitled, “Historical Overview of Catholic Education Law: How Did We Get Where We Are” for this journal (Shaughnessy, 2001). In 2001 readers were certainly aware of 
the importance of legal issues for the Catholic Church in general and Catholic 
schools in particular. The sexual abuse crisis, at least its public face, had not 
yet emerged. Administrators attended workshops, read articles, and pondered 
measures they should take to help ensure the legal rightness of their opera-
tions. Some 8 years later, those same administrators can perhaps only wonder 
at the naiveté they displayed, even as they believed themselves to be “on top” 
of legal issues.
A decade ago, many administrators felt a sense of protection: While other 
schools and institutions might be sued, their particular entities would be safe. 
It was not uncommon for an administrator to say, “I don’t see why I have to 
do that. We’ve always done it this way. God will take care of us. What’s the 
chance something will go wrong? And if it does, how can the church/school 
be held responsible?” Then, the crushing hammer of the sexual abuse crisis 
descended and, while administrators everywhere hoped to avoid the blows, 
few thought they and their institutions were forever immune. The days of 
“Father, Sister, Mrs. Jones” and even “the bishop says so” are gone; some 
say the moral authority of the Catholic Church is bankrupt. Others hold that it 
will be decades before the bishops regain any moral authority. If the Catholic 
Church and its administrators are seen as having little, if any, moral authority, 
it is a fairly easy leap to hold them accountable for anything that goes wrong 
in a Catholic institution. The court system offers one way to hold institutions 
accountable. The reticence that once precluded lawsuits against religious en-
tities is gone.
Eight years ago, topics such as Facebook, Myspace, blogging, and cyber-
bullying were only just emerging as areas of educator discussion and interest. 
The author admits, with a certain degree of chagrin, to being asked to give a 
workshop about 7 years ago to high school students on the dangers of blog-
ging, and having to ask what blogging was. Today, Catholic school educators 
Catholic Education: A Journal of Inquiry and Practice, Vol. 12, No. 4, June 2009, 519–535 
© Trustees of Boston College.
520        Catholic Education / June 2009
are quite familiar with blogging. The reality of blogging has given rise to 
many legal questions: (1) Can anyone just post the school’s insignia, logo, 
mission statement, etc. on his or her blog? (2) Does the school have any con-
trol over what a student, parent, or employee writes on his or her blog if what 
is written refl ects badly on the school or a member of the school community? 
(3) If one of our students threatens another student and uses his or her home 
computer to send the threat, can the school do anything? And if it can, should 
it? These are just a few of the questions commonly posed today that would 
have been unknown a few short years ago. The answers to these questions 
today may well determine the paths of litigation in the future. 
But fi rst, a bit of history: It has been less than 85 years since the Catholic 
Church established its right to operate Catholic schools. In the 1925 case of 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the United States Supreme Court recognized the 
right of Catholic schools to exist. Oregon, fearing the presence of foreigners, 
enacted a law requiring all children between the ages of 8 and 16 to go to pub-
lic schools. A religious community of women, the Sisters of the Holy Names 
of Jesus and Mary, who operated a school challenged the law. The United 
States Supreme Court found that religious institutions had a right to exist and 
offer religious and educational programs of their choosing
Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) is noteworthy for a number of reasons. 
Perhaps the least understood is the legal principle upon which the case was 
won. Most people believe that the case was argued and won on the right 
of parents to choose their children’s schools, rather than be forced to enroll 
their children in public schools. However, for that right to be the deciding 
factor, a parent would have had to bring the case. The Sisters were not par-
ents and, therefore, they could not bring a suit based on the rights of parents. 
In order to be heard in court, a litigant must have what is called standing 
to sue, sometimes popularly described as “having a dog in the fi ght.” The 
Sisters’ attorneys had to make a Fourteenth Amendment due process prop-
erty argument: The Oregon law, if enforced, would cause the Sisters to close 
their schools; the closing would mean they could not support themselves and 
possibly would lose the property. Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, the religious community, as a corporation, was a 
citizen with the constitutional right to hold property; the state of Oregon had 
to show a compelling interest in the law before it could enforce it, if the en-
forcement would result in the Sisters’ loss of property. The court rejected the 
arguments of the governor and his attorneys, many of which were based on 
the prejudices of the day; for example, that the only way to assimilate foreign-
ers into the culture of the United States was to force them into public schools 
where they could be molded into true Americans.
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So, where did the notion of parental rights arise? The court stated in a 
dictum (not, strictly speaking, part of the decision, but something the court 
wanted to say) that parents had the right to choose their children’s education. 
The court was basically putting the state of Oregon and all states on notice: 
If a state passes such a law and a parent challenges it on a constitutional right 
to choose, the parent will win. Nonetheless, the myth of parental rights as 
the deciding factor in the Pierce case continues, possibly because it seems a 
much more compelling argument than the right of anyone or any institution 
to hold property. 
This article will address the sources of the laws impacting Catholic edu-
cation, particularly constitutional law, statutory and regulatory law, and con-
tract law.  Specifi c issues related to these areas will be discussed, including 
discipline, lifestyle and belief, negligence, sexual abuse, boundaries, confi -
dentiality, cyberspace, and safety. The author endeavors to make practical 
applications and offer practical suggestions for “lawful” ministry.
Constitutional Rights in the Private Sector: 
Individuals Never Had Them, Probably Never Will
While a private institution, such as the Catholic Church, has constitutional 
rights guaranteed by the government, a private institution is not required to 
recognize and protect the constitutional rights of employees, students, pa-
tients, volunteers, etc. The lack of constitutional protections in the private 
sector is a reality that many people do not seem to understand. For some 25 
years, the author has used a true/false test in the presentation of education 
law seminars, lectures, and workshops. The fi rst statement is, “Students and 
teachers in Catholic schools and programs do not have the same rights they 
would have if they were in public schools and programs.” Invariably, employ-
ees and parents encountering this statement for the fi rst time, answer “false.” 
But the statement is true. One does not have the same rights in a Catholic 
school, for example, as one would have in a public school. A simple example 
will illustrate. If a Catholic school principal or director of religious education 
is walking down the hall and encounters a student wearing a button that states, 
“Abortion is a woman’s right,” the adult will tell the young person to remove 
the button, as it offends Catholic teaching. Yet, a student in a public school or 
a city-sponsored program could wear such a button. What is the difference? 
First Amendment freedom of expression does not exist in the Catholic or any 
private setting. The Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, dictates what 
the government must do, not what private persons or institutions must do. 
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Catholic school administrators can prohibit behaviors that public institu-
tions cannot. In very early rulings, the doctrine of separation of church and 
state protected church-sponsored institutions from being sued successfully. 
The last 30 years have seen a rise in the number of cases brought against the 
Catholic Church. The primary law governing church relations with members 
and employees is contract law, whereas in the public setting it is constitu-
tional law.
No court to date has ruled that religious institutions have to grant con-
stitutional protections. Before churches could be required to grant constitu-
tional protections, the substantial presence of the state, called state action, 
must be demonstrated: The court must determine that the state is signifi cantly 
involved in a specifi c contested private action to such an extent that the action 
can fairly be said to be that of the state. 
In 1969, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School District that public school students had con-
stitutional rights that school offi cials, as government agents, had to protect. 
Thus, it was only 40 years ago that public school students won United States 
Supreme Court recognition of constitutional rights. Not surprisingly, shortly 
thereafter, some Catholic and other private school students brought cases al-
leging violation of constitutional rights. Several early private school disci-
pline cases alleging constitutional deprivations resulted in fi ndings for the 
school. In the 1978 case of Geraci v. St. Xavier High School, Mark Geraci, a 
St. Xavier student, encouraged a student from another Catholic high school 
to come to St. Xavier during fi nal exam week and throw a pie in the face of 
a teacher. The school responded by expelling Geraci, who then brought a 
lawsuit alleging both constitutional and contract violations. Geraci’s lawyers 
offered a state action argument and claimed that the presence of state law 
governing some aspects of the Catholic school, such as teacher certifi cation 
and length of school year, made the school subject to the same constitution-
al requirements as public schools. The court found that, even if state action 
were present, it would have had to be so entwined with the contested activity 
(dismissal of the student) that the action could have been said to be that of 
the state, or that a symbiotic relationship had existed between the state and 
the school’s dismissal of the student. No such relationship could be estab-
lished, thus, state action was not present and constitutional protections did 
not apply. 
Aggrieved parties in the Catholic Church have not been able to make 
successful deprivation of constitutional rights arguments.  Persons increas-
ingly turn to courts to solve problems. Anyone can walk to the courthouse, 
pay the fee, and fi le a lawsuit. However, the mere fi ling of a lawsuit does not 
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mean it will ever be tried in court; many suits are dismissed in response to a 
motion for summary judgment: The court looked at the facts in the light most 
favorable to the party who did not bring the motion, and decided there was 
nothing for a court to decide. Some state legislators have discussed and even 
attempted to pass laws that would grant constitutional protections to students 
in private schools. Such a maneuver, if successful, would have given students 
in Catholic schools constitutional rights, not because of the Constitution, but 
because of statutory law, which can bind us in the Catholic Church, as the fol-
lowing discussion will illustrate. 
Statutory Issues
While perhaps the most well-known Catholic school cases involve breach of 
contract claims, cases alleging violation of statutory laws can also be found. 
Federal and state law can bind Catholic schools. For example, Catholic 
schools may not violate federal antidiscrimination law, except for the law 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of religion. A religious institution has 
the right to give preference in hiring to members of that particular religion, to 
accept or prefer members of the faith for admission, and to hold employees, 
volunteers, and students to the precepts of the religion of the sponsoring insti-
tution. Catholic schools are not free, however, to discriminate against persons 
on other federally protected grounds. Age is one such federally impermissible 
ground.  Once a person reaches the age of 40, he or she is protected against 
age discrimination. Race, gender, and national origin are other impermissible 
grounds. Still another is disability; an educational institution or program can-
not discriminate against an otherwise qualifi ed candidate for admission or 
employment simply because of the presence of a disability, if with reasonable 
accommodation, the individual can meet the requirements of the program of 
study or job. 
For a successful claim of discrimination, a litigant must show a prima 
facie (on the face of it) case. Once a prima facie case is established, the bur-
den of proof shifts to the party accused of discrimination to show that non-
renewal would have occurred even if the discriminatory reason did not exist. 
For example, the mere existence of a disability in a student applicant who is 
denied admission might not, in and of itself, be enough to make a prima fa-
cie case. However, if witnesses heard the admissions offi cer say, “We can’t 
keep taking kids with disabilities,” a prima facie case could be established. 
The 1980 Iowa case of Dolter v. Wahlert High School remains relevant. An 
unmarried female teacher in a Catholic high school became pregnant and her 
contract was not renewed. She alleged that male teachers who were known to 
524        Catholic Education / June 2009
have engaged in premarital sex were not held to the same standards as were 
female teachers. In ruling against a motion for summary judgment, the court 
held that it had to consider the facts as presented by the plaintiff (the non-
moving party) as true. Thus, the teacher had established a prima facie case of 
sex discrimination. The school then either had to rebut the sexual discrimina-
tion charge or show that there were other, nondiscriminatory reasons for the 
nonrenewal of employment. 
Clearly, Catholic schools are not immune to charges of discrimination. 
Administrators and other educators must construct policies that protect the rights 
of all and help to ensure that decisions are both legally and morally sound.
Contract Issues
Since constitutional arguments cannot be successfully advanced, persons 
generally raise breach of contract arguments against Catholic schools. The 
previously mentioned Geraci v. St. Xavier High School (1978) case also al-
leged breach of contract. The school, plaintiffs argued, breached its contract 
with the student and his parents when it expelled him, particularly in view of 
the fact that the student had never been in serious trouble, had paid the de-
posit for his senior year, and had received his senior ring. The school had a 
disciplinary code that prohibited, among other things, “immorality in talk or 
action” and “conduct detrimental to the reputation of the school.” The court 
ruled that throwing a pie in the face of a teacher was “patently immoral,” and 
therefore, the student breached the contract when he consented to and partici-
pated in such activity. The school’s general prohibitions were upheld. Church 
and school offi cials may spend unnecessary time trying to think of everything 
a person should be forbidden to do, when a broad clause will encompass all 
that is needed.
What happens when an individual claims that he or she has been disci-
plined in violation of contract or policy? The court will scrutinize the govern-
ing documents. Any ambiguity is resolved in favor of the non-writing party. 
The 1982 New Hampshire case, Reardon v. LeMoyne, will illustrate. Four re-
ligious sisters were told that their contracts as principal and teachers in a New 
Hampshire parish school would not be renewed. At trial, the court examined 
the contract signed by the sisters. One part of the contract stated that employ-
ment was for 1 year only and would end on a certain date in June; however, 
another part of the contract stated that a person could expect to be rehired 
until the summer following his or her 70th birthday—two very different re-
alities. In effect, the document guaranteed a 21-year-old 49 years of employ-
ment. Applying the rule of construing the document against the party who 
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wrote it, the court ruled that in effect the clauses canceled each other out. The 
sisters ultimately won the case, but agreed to an out-of-court settlement.
Even in successful breach of contract cases, reinstatement (getting one’s 
job or seat in the class back) is generally not a possibility. The remedy for 
breach of a contract for personal services has long been damages (money as 
compensation) rather than reinstatement. Nonetheless, it is not unheard of for 
a hearing or trial judge to issue an injunction barring a private school or other 
entity from dismissing an individual prior to the resolution of the case.
Discipline 
Employees and students tend to sue when faced with two realities—suspen-
sion and/or dismissal. In Geraci v. St. Xavier High School (1978), the court 
stated what the position of most courts would be: “The disciplinary proceed-
ings of a private school are not governed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution; nonetheless, under its broad equitable powers, a court will inter-
vene when the procedures do not comport with fundamental fairness” (p. 149-
150). What is “fundamental fairness?” Unfortunately, that term is also used 
as a defi nition for constitutional due process.  The Geraci court seemed to be 
talking about reasonableness, about treating people decently. Administrators 
can spend a lot of time asking, “Can I do this legally?” when a better question 
would be, “What should I do?” 
Since the United States Supreme Court has never heard a case involving 
student or employee discipline or dismissal in a Catholic school, there is no 
clear national precedent. Thus, state and other lower courts, when hearing 
such cases, must look to other state decisions for help in their legal decision 
making. Since many cases are eventually settled out of court, the number of 
reported cases is actually fairly small. Some cases, perhaps because of the is-
sues or fact patterns involved, seem to garner more publicity than others.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in the 2004 decision Gorman v. St. 
Raphael’s Academy, upheld the right of Catholic schools and programs to 
establish reasonable rules and regulations. Refl ecting the principle of judi-
cial restraint, the judges found that courts have no right to interfere in pri-
vate school disciplinary regulations unless they violate law or public policy. 
To comply with a new school rule regarding hair length, school offi cials in-
structed freshman Russell Gorman to cut his hair or face expulsion. Russell, 
with his parents’ support, refused. The parents sought and were granted a 
temporary restraining order keeping the school from expelling Russell for 
his hair length. The principal complied with the order for the school year, but 
then revised the school handbook for the next school year to include a new 
regulation stipulating that the hair of male students could be no longer than 
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the bottom of the shirt collar. School offi cials testifi ed that Russell’s parents 
were notifi ed of the impending rule change before the end of the school year; 
the parents claimed that they did not know of the change until the summer and 
were not given a new handbook until August of that year when they fi led an 
amended complaint alleging breach of contract and seeking injunctive relief. 
While speculation is always an inexact exercise, the plaintiff’s lawyer 
may not have raised any constitutional arguments because he knew they 
would not be successful; if breach of contract could be established, the case 
might be won without recourse to other arguments. One stumbling block that 
could have arisen was the fact that precedents (earlier decisions in similar 
cases) have routinely held that the remedy for breach of contract is damages, 
not specifi c reinstatement. In the Gorman v. St. Raphael’s Academy (2004) 
case the trial judge, relying on a public school case, held that the rule was 
arbitrary and capricious and that the school’s rules had to be related to the 
mission of the school. In effect, the judge violated the principle of judicial 
restraint, which holds that courts do not generally substitute their opinions 
for those of the professionals. St. Raphael’s Academy appealed the decision, 
which could have, if upheld at the highest levels, had the effect of making 
virtually every Catholic school rule subject to judicial scrutiny.
The Gormans alleged breach of contract. St. Raphael’s Academy argued 
that the Gormans did not identify the alleged contract, its terms or breach. The 
state supreme court found that the trial judge applied equitable, rather than le-
gal, principles to the claim. An equitable remedy is only available when there 
is no adequate remedy at law. In this breach of contract case, the legal remedy 
of damages was available and therefore, specifi c performance (reinstatement) 
was inappropriate. The trial judge suggested that the Gormans had a 4-year 
contract for Russell’s education, a suggestion that the state supreme court 
rejected, while it held that the contract was an annual one subject to renewal. 
(A 1981 Illinois decision, Bloch v. Hillel Torah North Suburban Day School, 
had declined to support a similar argument—the mere fact of enrollment in a 
school evidenced the existence of a multiyear contract to educate a student.) 
The state supreme court opinion held that this decision was one of fi rst im-
pression, the fi rst time such a confl ict had been litigated. Further, the justices 
observed that they could fi nd no published case in any jurisdiction that dealt 
with hair-length rules in private educational institutions.  Thus, this decision 
was groundbreaking. The court stated, “Because contracts for private educa-
tion have unique qualities, we must construe them in a manner that leaves 
the school administration broad discretion to meet its educational and doctri-
nal responsibilities” (Gorman v. St. Raphael’s Academy, 2004). School hand-
books can be considered contracts. Parents of St. Raphael’s students were 
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required to sign tuition contracts agreeing to the terms of the student hand-
book. Therefore, the court held that the relationship between students/parents 
and the school was a contractual one. The court recognized that some public 
school litigants have alleged that the right to wear one’s hair the way one 
wishes is a constitutional freedom guaranteed by the First Amendment, but 
following earlier federal decisions, held that a private school would have to 
be a state actor before it would be required to recognize constitutional rights. 
Therefore, no constitutional protections existed.
So long as schools exist and students are disciplined, particularly when 
the more extreme penalties of suspension and expulsion are imposed, stu-
dents and parents will sue the school. While a Catholic school cannot arbi-
trarily do anything it wishes and/or recklessly disregard its own policies and 
procedures, the doctrine of judicial restraint means that courts will not sub-
stitute their personal opinions for that of the professionals. Further, no mat-
ter how unfair a particular rule may seem, if the school has clearly stated the 
rule, preferably in writing, and a parent chooses to have his or her child attend 
the school, a court will generally uphold the rule. In the 1975 Louisiana case 
of Flint v. St. Augustine High School, two boys were expelled for a second 
smoking offense. The handbook stated that a fi rst offense resulted in a $5 fi ne; 
the penalty for a second offense was a $10 fi ne or expulsion. The two students 
were expelled for a second offense late in their senior year. Evidence estab-
lished that no second or even third offender had ever been expelled; all had 
been fi ned. Nonetheless, the court held that, while it found the school’s ac-
tions regrettable, the administrator was clearly acting within his rights. Thus, 
Catholic educators may fi nd themselves on the proverbial horns of a dilem-
ma. The law may permit a certain action, courts may be compelled to hold the 
action legal, but those two realities do not make the action right.  Nonetheless, 
courts rarely substitute the personal opinions of judges for those of the profes-
sional decision makers.
Issues of lifestyle and belief. A specifi c area of concern in discipline of 
employees is lifestyle and belief. Catholic parish and school employees can 
properly be said to be representatives of the Church 24 hours a day, 7 days a 
week. What they do, regardless of when or in what capacity they do it, can and 
does affect the reputation of the parish and/or school. It is not uncommon for 
a news story to lead off with, “Catholic school teacher [or principal] accused 
of. . .” rather than “John Doe accused of . . .” Therefore, the Catholic Church, 
like any private institution, has the right to set behavioral standards for its 
students, employees, participants, volunteers, etc. This right is not absolute, 
however; courts have been careful to hold private institutions to their stated 
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policies and procedures, to their contractual responsibilities and to statutory 
law. A rather old case illustrates. In the 1973 Michigan case of Wiethoff v. St. 
Veronica School, a teacher, who married a priest who had left the priesthood 
without obtaining laicization that would have allowed him to marry within 
the Catholic Church, was dismissed from her position before the beginning of 
the school year. She sued. Almost any person teaching in a Catholic school, at 
least at that time period, would have known that such an action would result 
in a loss of employment as a Catholic school teacher. However, the teacher’s 
contract bound her to the “promulgated policies” of the parish. The school 
board had passed a policy requiring that all teachers be practicing Catholics, 
but that policy had never been promulgated; its passage had been noted in 
the board minutes that were fi led in the board secretary’s fi les. Therefore, the 
court ruled that the parish breached its contract with the teacher because it 
had failed to promulgate the policy it was attempting to hold her responsible 
for obeying. She did not get her position back; but she was able to avail her-
self of the remedy for breach of contract: damages, as mentioned above. She 
collected her salary for the whole year.
In 1990, a Pennsylvania court decided the case of Little v. St. Mary 
Magdalene Parish. Ms. Little, who taught in a Catholic school but was not a 
Catholic, had signed the standard contract that contained a provision popu-
larly called the “Cardinal’s Clause,” which requires persons to “live a life 
consistent with the teachings of the Catholic Church.” Ms. Little entered into 
marriage with a Catholic gentleman who had been previously married, but 
who had not yet obtained an annulment. Such a marriage was permissible in 
Ms. Little’s religion; nonetheless, the court upheld the school’s right to dis-
miss her from her position because she had violated a clause of the contract.
In 2004, a Catholic schoolteacher in Delaware signed a pro-choice ad that 
appeared in a local newspaper. The chief administrator promptly fi red her. 
She sued, invoking a number of legal arguments, perhaps the most novel of 
which maintained that the Catholic school that employed her could not claim 
a religious exemption from compliance with religious discrimination laws 
(e.g., an institution operated by a religious organization can discriminate on 
the basis of religion) because a Catholic high school is not a religious orga-
nization (Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Academy of Wilmington, Delaware, Inc., 
2004). The appellate judge declined even to consider the patently baseless 
argument. In upholding the termination, the court ruled that a religious orga-
nization could terminate the employment of a person who acted in a manner 
inconsistent with the teachings of the sponsoring religion. 
Catholic schools and educational programs have the clearly protected right 
to uphold the teachings of the Church and to require employees, volunteers, 
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and schools to uphold those teachings.  Problems can arise, however, when 
actions are inconsistent, (e.g., when one person who takes a particular ac-
tion loses his job while another who does the very same thing keeps hers). 
Catholic schools are granted broad leeway in the interpretation of religious 
principles, but the unequal treatment of persons can pose diffi culties.
Negligence
Negligence is the most often litigated case in education. Negligence, at its 
core, is an absence of care; it is the violation of a duty that proximately causes 
an injury. It is important to note that negligence law applies equally in the 
public and private sectors. For two decades, the most often mentioned case 
involving Catholic schools may well be the 1982 Missouri case, Smith v. 
Archbishop of St. Louis, in which a 7-year-old’s costume caught fi re from a 
candle kept all day on a teacher’s desk during the month of May to honor the 
Virgin Mary. The young girl sustained horrible injuries. The diocesan insurer 
paid compensatory and actual damages, but the young girl, a keloid former 
for whom plastic surgery was not an option, is sentenced to a lifetime of fa-
cial deformity and social handicap. Why? Because a teacher wanted to burn 
a candle to honor the Mother of God, certainly a good action, but the teacher 
failed to think through the possible consequences. She did not foresee pos-
sible injury. She did not mean for the child to be harmed, but without her ac-
tion, no harm would have occurred. 
Negligence, by defi nition, implies an absence of intent. If someone in-
tends to harm someone, negligence is not the appropriate claim if injury is 
sustained; one would need to allege assault and/or battery or defamation or 
several other claims. Educators sometimes have a hard time with the reality 
that damages can be awarded to an injured party even if there was no intent 
to injure. There is a distinction made between gross negligence and ordinary 
negligence, with gross negligence (in effect, an action or inaction that shocks 
the court) generally resulting in larger monetary awards.
When deciding negligence claims, courts often consider the concept 
of foreseeability: Should a reasonable person in the accused’s position be 
expected to have foreseen that injury might result from a certain action or 
failure to act? Teachers are expected to be foreseers of possible risks and in-
juries. In the wake of the school violence of the past decade, the following 
advice seems appropriate: Imagine the worst things that could happen in your 
school, religious education program, and/or youth ministry program. Then, 
talk about how you would deal with those things. From that conversation, the 
beginnings of a crisis plan emerge. 
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Recent case law. The following three cases are representative of more 
recent negligence cases involving Catholic schools. In the 2007 case, Dwyer 
v. Diocese of Rockville Centre, the diocese was granted its motion for sum-
mary judgment and the case was dismissed in a negligence claim brought by 
a high school student playing basketball who sustained an injury when he ran 
into and shattered a pane of glass. Although the glass had been in place for 
many years, the diocese was able to submit evidence demonstrating that the 
glass met all applicable building codes in effect at the time it was installed. 
Therefore, the court found that the diocese was entitled to summary judg-
ment as a matter of law. In another 2007 case, McCollin  v. Roman Catholic 
Archdiocese of New York, an eighth grade student was injured when a ninth 
grader, who was supposed to be assisting the coach, kicked him in the face. 
The court found that the student’s action was not foreseeable and, therefore, 
the school could not be held liable, i.e., a reasonable coach would not be ex-
pected to foresee that a student who had never kicked another would suddenly 
do so. In a third 2007 case, Ribaudo v. La Salle Institute, a basketball player 
was injured when he ran into a concrete wall during a basketball tournament 
in the school gymnasium and sought to hold the school liable for negligence. 
The court held that a student and his or her parents have to accept and assume 
the risks involved in playing a sport. The case was dismissed. Courts have 
found that Catholic schools cannot foresee certain injuries while on the play-
ing fi eld or in the gym, but documentation can also help Catholic schools in 
negligence cases.
Supervision
Everyone will agree that adults have the duty to supervise young people. In 
schools and religious education programs, adults supervise the learning and 
the safety of young people. Schoolteachers, by and large, have had at least 
some basic instruction in the supervision of young people. Catechists, youth 
ministry volunteers, and school volunteers may have little or no instruction in 
supervision of young people. 
A concept relatively recent in case law is that of mental supervision. 
Supervision is a mental as well as a physical act. It is not enough to be physi-
cally present, one has to be present mentally as well. In many, if not most 
negligence cases in past decades, injuries occurred when the teacher or other 
supervising adult was absent. The court then had to determine if the pres-
ence of an adult would have prevented the injury from occurring. Today, 
there seems to be almost as many negligence cases in which the teacher was 
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present but alleged to have not been paying attention as there are cases in 
which injuries occurred in the teacher’s absence. Case law in the last decade 
demonstrates that injured students are no longer simply saying, “I was hurt 
and no teacher was present,” but rather, “I was hurt, you were there, but you 
weren’t paying any attention.” 
Adult supervisors must be mentally engaged with what is occurring while 
they are responsible for supervision. Courts have stated that there are times 
when a teacher must take care of a situation outside the classroom and will 
leave the class unattended. A court will generally utilize “the reasonable per-
son” test: Did the supervisor act in a way that one could expect a reasonable 
person to act? If the adult is present, he or she is expected to be present men-
tally. How can administrators ensure mental presence? One can ensure mental 
presence by talking to adult supervisors about it and by requiring administra-
tors to supervise the adult supervisors. This topic is sometimes a sore one. No 
one likes to be told to pay attention. But, in effect, that is what administrators 
must do: Pay attention to those they supervise.
Sexual Abuse
Certainly no cause of action has brought us greater pain than sexual abuse. 
Even though it is not the most often litigated claim, it is possibly the most 
tragic. No one can give a person back his or her innocence. Administrators 
must act swiftly, decisively, and appropriately in accordance with diocesan 
policy and with due care for both the victim and the alleged perpetrator.
All who serve in the educational ministries of the Catholic Church must 
avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Over two decades ago when the 
author was a high school principal, one of the male teachers once said, “I 
would never stay alone in a room with a girl unless the door was open or peo-
ple could see in through a window.” That observation is as true today as it was 
in the 1980s. A reputation is a terrible thing to lose and is almost impossible to 
rebuild, as persons often remember the accusation but not the exoneration.
There is a related issue raising legal concerns today—boundary issues: 
There have to be boundaries in relationships. Sometimes, well-meaning per-
sons get “too close” to others. People tell all and answer any question. Far from 
being open, they are destroying the boundary to which the person being min-
istered needs. Boundaries are healthy and personal boundaries help us to keep 
within the legal boundaries that surround our ministry. Several of the author’s 
books published by the National Catholic Educational Association contain 
recommendations for avoiding the appearance of impropriety (Shaughnessy, 
2005, 2006, 2007, 2009; Shaughnessy & Shaughnessy, 1993).
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Confi dentiality
All who work in Church ministries must realize that there is no legal privilege 
in matters involving life and safety. There are only two privileges left in this 
country: priest/penitent, which is absolute, and attorney/client. All other indi-
viduals receiving information that may indicate a danger to individuals must 
report that information to appropriate persons and take all reasonable steps to 
ensure the safety of any individuals who appear to be in danger.  Persons who 
are in professional counseling positions sometimes chafe at being told to re-
port confi dential information. Guidelines for professional organizations may 
direct persons to keep information received in counseling sessions confi den-
tial. But, there is no legal protection for the retreat director, for example, who 
is told by a student that he or she is contemplating suicide and who fails to do 
anything with that knowledge.
One of the fastest growing areas of litigation in public schools is journal 
writing. Case usually goes something like this: Person writes in journal: “I’m 
so depressed, I think I’ll kill myself.” Teacher writes back, “Please don’t. 
We’d miss you.” Student kills self. Parents get journal and sue (see Brooks v. 
Logan, 1995). Schools, religious education, and youth ministry programs of-
ten use journals. Please require all who may receive confi dences to say to the 
confi ding individual, “I will keep your confi dence so long as no one’s health, 
life, or safety is involved. Once health, life, or safety is involved, confi denti-
ality is gone.” 
In the Michael Corneal, Paducah, Kentucky school shooting, parents of the 
victims brought lawsuits against many, including teachers.  After Columbine, 
parents brought lawsuits alleging that the school should have done more to 
alert others, because of the writings and words of the killers. Hindsight is al-
ways 20/20. While courts appear reluctant to hold teachers responsible for the 
misdeeds of their students, failure to act on warning signals can land educa-
tors in court when someone is injured and allegations of “If only the teacher 
had said something” are made.
Cyberspace and Its Challenges:
Facebook, Myspace, Cyberbullying, and Beyond
The term “blog” or web log is a recent one in the memory of most educators, 
but for many students it is a term that they have grown up knowing. The sites 
myspace.com and its progeny began innocently enough. Adults were able to 
share ideas, poems, thoughts, photos, etc. with other bloggers and site visi-
tors.  There was/is little or no monitoring of content or bloggers. Sites may 
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include a statement that all bloggers must be a certain age; however, there is 
no foolproof way to ensure that persons under the minimum age will not have 
access. Students generally blog from home, not school, but two problem areas 
cause administrative concern: (1) blogger safety and (2) the appropriateness 
of what the blogger posts.
Safety
Young school age bloggers often post identifying personal information that 
can have tragic consequences. Anyone with Internet access, including sexu-
al predators and murderers, can log onto a blog. Many young people do not 
seem to understand mortality, at least their own: Bad things happen to “other 
people.” However, nothing prevents a predator from noting a child or adoles-
cent’s picture, address, phone number, school, extracurricular activities, etc. 
and making plans to intercept the young person. The author presents work-
shops and seminars on blogging and Internet safety to audiences all over the 
country. Recently, however, a 9-year-old member of the author’s own fam-
ily, claiming to be older than she is, set up her own blog on one of the more 
popular sites and began happily chatting away with much older individuals. 
Often, even the most vigilant adult monitoring cannot prevent such occur-
rences. Children accustomed to using the Internet do not and perhaps cannot 
appreciate the dangers to which they open themselves by pretending to be 
adults. So, would a school administrator or teacher be held liable for a student 
who is injured as a result of talking online with a predator? It is an inchoate 
area of law, but it is always best to be vigilant. The safety of young people is 
paramount. Whatever can be done to keep those we serve safe and educate 
parents should be done, regardless of whether the law requires it.
Appropriateness of Blogger Posts
Cyberspace and the “It didn’t happen at school” argument. Educators 
are already familiar with the issues arising from student threats conveyed 
through e-mail. Blogging provides another venue for making threats. Threats 
are threats wherever they are made. Individual blogs have been and continue 
to be used to plot crimes and to solicit criminal activity. If challenged, the 
blogger will generally claim that he or she was joking. If a crime occurs, es-
pecially if someone is injured or killed, who is responsible? Is it the blogger 
who posts a solicitation such as “I need someone to kill my brother; I will pay 
in money or sex,” but claims after the fact to be joking, or is the responsible 
person the one who actually did the deed? Can both be held responsible? 
A more common problem occurs when students make negative, often 
untruthful statements about staff and other students. In addition to blogging 
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opportunities, some websites provide a place to “rate” teachers and to post 
potentially defamatory statements. Holding that teachers were, in effect, qua-
si-public fi gures and had to expect a certain amount of “grief” from parents 
and students, courts in the past were reluctant to fi nd in favor of teachers who 
brought defamation suits against parents or students. Such is no longer the 
case. Several state courts have ruled that teachers and administrators have 
the same right to their reputations as do other people. Therefore, if defamed, 
educators have a right to sue.
When school administrators attempt to discipline students for Internet 
threats, defamatory material on blogs, etc., parents and students may argue 
that the school has no jurisdiction over what happens outside school. What 
students do outside school hours and off school property can refl ect on the 
school. Catholic school administrators should ensure that handbooks include 
a disciplinary regulation that states that the school can discipline students for 
“conduct, whether inside or outside school, that is detrimental to the reputa-
tion of the school” [author’s suggested wording].  
Use of school name and logo. The Catholic school or parish owns the 
school or program’s name and administrators have the right to restrict its use. 
An administrator can determine that an after-prom party organized by parents 
is not a school event and can decline to allow the use of the school name; in 
the same way, rules can prohibit unauthorized use of school names and logos 
on blogs. 
Adult staff and blogs. Many adults have blogs. Some use blogs as a way 
to communicate with friends and families. It is easy to forget that virtually 
anyone in the world can access a blog. What a person posts can certainly 
come back to “haunt” him or her. A person is just as responsible for what is 
posted on his or her blog as for what is said or written in other venues. 
Some teachers, and even a few principals, have expressed to the author a 
desire to have a blog to which their students have access. Arguing that blogs 
have become the playgrounds, ice rinks, and hangouts of today’s youth, edu-
cators may believe that blogging is a way to be relevant and to meet stu-
dents “where they are.” This author remains unconvinced, at least at this time. 
Professional web pages for parishes and schools are a better and safer means 
of communicating, at least from a legal standpoint, than individual blogs.
Conclusion
Legal issues can be frightening for educators. The number of cases against 
Catholic schools, parishes, and programs is increasing. The vast majority of 
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readers were not thinking about laws and litigation when they decided to be-
come educators. Yet, civil law weaves a boundary around everything that is 
done in our society. Stay within the boundary and one should be safe. Move 
outside it and one puts everything inside, i.e., one’s ministry, at risk. 
When in doubt, seek competent advice. It is far better to ask what may ap-
pear to be a “dumb” question than to guess at the answer and fi nd that one has 
put one’s self at legal risk. The master teacher himself, Jesus Christ, perhaps 
said it best, “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and unto God 
the things that are God’s.” If educators are respectful of legal boundaries, they 
will be better able to perform the role of teacher and mentor.
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